Ian B. Rhodes (hI'67) Absfracf-Two stochastic optimal control problems are solved whose performance criteria are the expected values of exponential functions of quadratic forms. The optimal controller is linear in both cases but depends upon the covariance matrix of the additive process noise so that the certainty equivalence principle does not hold. The controllers are shown to be equivalent to those obtained by solving a cooperative and a noncooperative quadratic (dserential) game, and this leads to some interesting interpretations and observations. Finally, some stability properties of the asymptotic controllers are discussed. T I. IXTRODFCTION HE SO-CALLED linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) problem' of optimal stochastic control [ l ] pozL <$esse8 a number of interesting features. First, the opt. This 1s a problem with linear dynamics disturbed by additive Gausian noise, together m-ith a performance criterion which is the expected value of a positive-semidefinite quadratic form.
variables. Second, this 1inea.r controller is identical to that, xhich is obtained by neglecting the addit.ive Gaussian noise and solving the resulta.nt deterministic linear-quadratic problem (LQP) * (certainty equivalence principle).
Thus the controller for the stochastic system is independent of the statistics of the additive noise. This is appealing for small noise intensity. but for large noise (large Covariance) one has the intuitive feeling that perhaps a different controller would be more appropriate.
I n this paper 11-e consider optimal control of linear systems dist.urbed by additive Gaussian noise, \Those associated performance criteria are t.he expected values of exponential functions of nega.t.ive-semidefinite and positivesemidefinite quadratic forms. We shall refer to the former case as the LE-G problem, and the latter as the LE+G problem, and t.0 their deterministic counberparts as LE-P and LE-P, respectively. In the deterministic cases LE'P, the solutions are identica.1 to that for the LQP (the natural logarithm of t.he exponential performance criteria yields quadratic forms). However, n-hen noise is present. LE*G problems, the optimal controllers are different from that of the LQG problem. In particular, though a5 in the cme of the LQG problem. these are linea? functions of the state This is the same as the LQG problem, hut with noise set. to zero. variables, they depend explicitly upon the covaria.nce matrices of the additive Gau.ssian noise.
For small noise int.ensit,y (small covariance) the solut.ions of the LE*G and LQG problems are close, but for large noise int.ensity t.here is a marked difference. In particula,r, as the noise intensit.y tends t,o infinity t,he optimal gains for t.he LE-G problem tend t.0 zero; intuitively this implies t.hat if t.he random input is "very wild" 1itt.le can be .gained (in t.he sense of reducing the va.lue of t.his particular performance crit.erion) by controlling t.he system. In the LE+G problem the opt.imal controller ceases to exist if t.he noise int.ensity is sufKciently large (t,hat is, the performance criterion becomes infinite, regardless of the cont,rol input,).
These new controllers, which ret,ain the simplicity of the solution of the LQG problem, could prove t,o be attractive in certain applications.
I n addition to formulating and solving the LE*G problems, --e demonstrate that. their solut,ions are equivalent t o the solutions of cooperative and noncooperat,ive linear-quadrat.ic zero-sum (differential) ga.mes. These equivalences provide interpretations for t.he stochastic controllers in terms of solutioas of deterministic zero-sum games, and srice versa. It is hoped that t.hese equivalences will aid in t,he quest for new formulations a.nd (proofs of existence of) solut,ions of stochastic nonlinear systems and nonlinear differential games.
We investiga.t.e briefly the infinite-time version of the LE*G problems and point out, t.hat the steady-st.ate optimal controller for the LE-G problem is not, necessarily stable. On the other hand, the steady-state optimal controller for the LE,+G problem, if it exists, is stable. Thus the LE+G formulation may be preferable in the infinite-time case.
FORMULATIOX OF DISCRETE-TIME LEfG PROBLEMS

A . D ymmics
We shall consider a. linear discrete-time dynanuc system described by
x. given, (1) where the "state"vector xk E R", the control vector 
B. hToise
The noise input is a sequence {ak) of independently distributed Gaussian random variables having probability densit,y
wherep,:R@X R " -t R + a n d p : R Q X I +~R + a r e g i v e n b ;
C . Perjormance Criterion
The performance of t.he stochastic linear syst,ems is measured by the criterion (vit.h u = -for LE-G and
A u&lr, II ~,"(~l;;lc.)~,"(~~;k)~~"(~.~-~N (6)
and
R, > 0 (positive definite) ; k = 0,. , N -1. (10) Note t,hat, (6) can be writt.en as
D . Problem
We are required t,o find a policy ~k "
C,"(X,),
which minimizes performance criterion (11).
are bounded as follows :
Yote that V--(zo) and V+(xo) for arbitrary controls {uk)
FORMULATION OF LE+P
If no noise is present,
Minimization of (11) is equivalent to minimization of subject. t.0
which is a standard LQP. Thus LE-P and LE+P are equivalent. and both will be referred to as LEP. As the solution of the LQP is well known, we st.ate it now without proof.
The optima.1 controller for the LEP(LQP) is and identical results would be obtained.
Alternatively, the development could be continued using (X),
I n addition, we have that
and the optimal policy is
where C," 4 (R, + BpTT-i;;+l"B,) -1B,T,+1"&;
In order to prove that, (30) and (36) solve (28), we need the following probably n-ell-known but underexploit.ed lemma.
Lenmza: If
where TT' ,+l" is defined i n (33). Equation (39) is satisfied by (32), (36): and (37), so that the LE*G problem is indeed solved. As in the LEP (LQP), it is easy to verify that, under assumptions (-it),
(9), and (lo), IFJ:-and IT7/:-are positive semidefinite for
which ensures that. (32), (33), (35), and (37) are well defined for negat.ive u.
V . PROPERTIES OF SOLGTIOXS OF DISCRETE-TIME LE*G PROBLEXS
A . The LE-G Problem
The optimal feedback controller for the LE-G problem is a linear f u n d o n of the syst.em state
The main difference between this and the feedba.ck law for the LQG problem is that Ck-depends upon. P,;-l, the covariance matrix of the Gaussian additive disturbance 0 1~~. In the LQG case the optimal feedback law is indepemlent of the Covariance of the input noise and, indeed, is the same as that for the deterministic LQP (so-died cert.aint,y equivalence principle). Here, in the case where our criterion 1s the expected value of minus, an exponent.ia1 function of a negative-semidefinite quadratic form, the cert.ainty equivalence principle does not hold.
It is int,eresting to invest.igate two limit,ing cases: the first in which Amin (Pb) + m (input ollr 0, k = 0,. . e , N -1) ; and t.he second in which Amin (P,-') 4 a (input "infinitely wild"). 
for which the new controller (36) offers an alternative to the standard LQG solution.
B. The LE+G Problem
As in t.he LE-G problem t,he cert.aint,y equivalence principle does not hold because Ck+ depends upon the covariance of the additive process noise. We a.gain consider the t.wo limiting cases of zero noise and "infinite" noise. 
Case 1 (A,,,in(Pk)
and that
From (53), (54), (32), and (33) we have that rl:Twr+l+r, > 0 ;
so that for P , su&cientJy small
which implies that the left-hand side of (38) is infinite. Clearly, then,
Since k is arbitrary, k E {O,. . ,A7 -I}, we can conclude that if the noise covariance is sufficient.ly large, the performance criterion P+(z0) is infinite, regardless of the choice of controls {u.,} . We sha.11 have more to say about.
this interesting case when we t,reat the continuous-time LE+G problem in Section VIII.
VI. THE DISCRETE-TILIE LE';G PROBLEJIS 4 K D DETERMIXISTIC GASIES A . T h e LE-G Problem
The solution of the LE-G problem is, by inspection (or short, calculation), equivalent to the solution of the following cooperative deterministic game (LQP) :
subject. to the dynamic constraint x0 given. (59) It turns out t.hat
Kote that in the above formulat.ion we determine opt,imal control l a m (61) We now have a new interpretation for the lincarquadratic game. If player u k ussumes that player a&: will cooperate in minimizing the quadratic criterion (ercn though u p knom that c y I ; behaves as a Gaussian random variable), then the feedback controller (policy) that is obtained for u6, upon solving (58) and (59): namely, (62) is optimal also for the LE-G problem. Thus the policy for ut obtained by treating cyk as a cooperatit-e player makes sense when interpreted as the solution of the stochastic LE-G problem.
B. The LE+G Problem
Here, the deterministic game that. has an equivalent solution is noncooperat.ive, namely,
If the determinant of t,he left-hand side of (65) is nonzero but the matrix fails to be positive definite, then, as is well known, (63) cea.5es to be bounded. Hon-ever, if the lefthand side of (65) (63) is finite.
Our interpretation of the above noncooperative deterministic game is as follows: If player u I : assumes that at will not. cooperate in minimizing the quadratic criterion (even though uk know that ap behaves as a Gau:-' w a n random variable), then the feedback controller (policy) that is obt.ained for uk, upon solving (63), namely, (68) is optimal for the LE+G problem. Thus this rat.her conservative game formulation in which the noise at is treated as a noncooperatiL:e player gives rise to a control policy which solves the LE+G stochastic control problem. When looked at from this viewpoint the min-max game solution for uk ('karst case design") does not appear t o be too pessimistic, since the performance criterion of the LE +G problem is rather appealing.
1' 11. FORMULAT~OK OF COST~KUOUS-T~~IE LE*G PROBLENS
In cont.inuous time, the LEhG problems t.ake the form
where, for notational simplicity, t,ime dependence of the variables has been suppressed5 and where a( -) is a Ga.ussian x-hite-noise process having
subject. to (59), n-here and CY,+ are determined as
) feedback l a m (policies) n-here 6 is the Dirac de1t.a function.
Sote that in solving (69) we seek an optimal control policy X-= 0,. . .!X -1. (64) It is well known that if to,t,I; x 4 (zb) ;7 E [to,tI] (73) st-here c": e x R 1 + R" is a measurable function of its arguments.
VIII. SOLUTIOS OF COKTIKUOUS-TIME LE+G PROBLEM AND RELATION TO DIFFERESTIAL G-kl\iEs A . Solution of LE*G Problems
We can solve the continuous-time LE*G problem either by formally taking the limit of t.he solut.ions for the discrete-t,ime cases or by solving t.he "genera.lized" Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (z,t) at where is the optimal policy. Using either method, we find that
B. Relation to Continuous-Time Differential Games
By inspection we see that. the optimal controller for the LE-G problem (u negative) is obtained from the solution of the following cooperative d8erent.ial game : (82) 1 2 subject to where we require the opt.ima1 controls in feedback (policy) form which resu1t.s in
Because of our assumptions of positive (sen1i)defhitmess of Q, R, P, and Q f J it is known that S-(t) exists for all t E [fo,t,j so t.hat (69) is well posed.
In the case of the LE+G problem, the appropriat,e differentia.1 game is noncooperative, namely, subject to (83). The opt,imal feedback laws are and 
and n-e have the steady-state feedback gain
We now define
which is posit.ive definite. Along trajectories of (91): we ha.ve
which, upon using (92), is
Kow if
we hare
and system (91), x%-ith controller C,-, is asymptotically stable.
Kote that simple examples show that (91) can be mstable if condition (97) is violated.
B. Stability Properties of Cm+
In this case we assume condition (go), namely,
and also that, Q > 0. Sote that. because of (99) asymptotic st,abilitg of (91) with controllers C,-or C,+. In the first case, (97) is used to guarantee negativity of L-, xhile in the second it is used t o guarantee existence of S , +.
X. COKCLUSIOS
In this paper u-e have presented explicit (modulo solution of Riccat.i difference or differential equations) solutions of stochastic control problems having linear dynamics, additive Gaussian noise, and exponential objective functions. These solutions are linear feedback control policies which depend upon the covariance matrix of the additive process noise so t.hat. the certainty equivalence principle of LQG theory does not hold. I n certain applications these new controllers may be preferable, especially perhaps in economics n-here multiplicativc objective functions are of intrinsic interest..
By demonstrating certain equivalences between our stochastic control formulations and deterministic different.ial games: we are able to give a stochastic interpretation to min-max (worst case) design of linear s-stems. This suggests that the LLpes~imisti~" min-max design is not. unat.tractive since it corresponds, in a stochastic setting, to minimization of the expected value of an exponent.ia1 function of a quadratic form, which is quite an a.ppealing criterion. Another significant result of t.hese equivalences is that existence of solutions of the stochastic control problems implies and is implied by existence of solut.ions of the differential games. Hopefully these notions can be extended to provide existence results for nonlinear stochastic control problems and nonlinear differential games.
Certain stability properties of the steady-state solutions of the stochastic control problem are also investigated. In particular, we point, out that the steady-state controller for t.he LE-G problem can result in an unstable dynamic system, while the steady-state controller for the LE+G problem, if it exists, a.lways shbilizes t.he dynamic system. In this sense, the LE+G formulation is preferable.
Sote that we have not considered in this paper the more complex problem in which noisy measurements of the state are made, viz., The above problenl appears to be intrinsically much harder than t.he perfect, state case and could be t,he t,opic of a future paper.
